The prospect of using cell-based interventions to treat neurological conditions raises several important ethical and policy questions. In this target article, we focus on issues related to the unique constellation of traits that characterize CBIs targeted at the central nervous system. In particular, there is at least a theoretical prospect that these cells will alter the recipients' cognition, mood, and behavior—brain functions that are central to our concept of the self. The potential for such changes, although perhaps remote, is cause (...) for concern and careful ethical analysis. Both to enable better informed consent in the future and as an end in itself, we argue that early human trials of CBIs for neurological conditions must monitor subjects for changes in cognition, mood, and behavior; further, we recommend concrete steps for that monitoring. Such steps will help better characterize the potential risks and benefits of CBIs as they are tested and potentially used for treatment. (shrink)

Philosophers are inclined to raise philosophical dust by asking such questions as, what relations must exist between two body occurrences for them to be body occurrences of the same body? or what relation among person-stages makes them stages of the same person? and then complain that they cannot see the answers. I want to argue that the reason they cannot see the answers is that these questions and others like them are misconceived.

In Book II of Plato's Republic, Glaucon, after putting on the mantle of Thrasymachus, concludes that in order for Socrates to show that justice is to be valued for its own sake, he must show that the just man who appears to be unjust is happier than the unjust man who appears to be just. In other words, according to Glaucon, Socrates must show that the just man who as a result of appearing to be unjust is thrown in prison, (...) scoured and racked, has his eyes burned out and is finally impaled, presumably on a spear, is happier than the unjust man who through appearing to be just is rewarded with high office, wealth and is permitted to marry into the best of families. Adiemantus it will be noticed reaches a similar conclusion. (shrink)

Both the Correspondence Theory of Truth and the Redundancy/Performative Theory of Truth appear to be unquestionably correct and yet each seems to be inconsistent with the other. As a result we have a puzzle. The way out of this dilemma is to be found by taking a closer look at the role that ‘Is’ and its cognates play in the structure of the standard statement. Once this is done it can be seen that both theories are compatible with one another.

Descartes with his sharp separation of the mental and the physical set the stage for the philosophy of mind for the next 350 years. Philosopher Patrick T. Mackenzie finds in the later writings of Wittgenstein the suggestion that Descartes got off on the wrong foot. Following Wittgenstein's lead, Mackenzie argues that instead of analyzing our human nature as a composite of mind and body, we should view ourselves as whole persons. One of the dividends of this approach to (...) the mind-body problem is that it provides us with a resolution to the problem of human freedom—i.e., how can a human being be free if his or her body (including the brain) belongs to a deterministic world? Mackenzie here argues that the person is largely free even though the movements of the body are determined by neurophysiological events. He takes the same approach to the philosophy of mind as that taken by M.R.Bennett and P.M.S.Hacker in their recent and controversial book, The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. Mackenzie's approach is, however, much more accessible. Students of philosophy and philosophers interested in the problem of human freedom will welcome Mackenzie's fresh approach, especially those disenchanted by the present list of mind-body "isms.". (shrink)

Michael Hand presents the problem for his paper succinctly in his response: ‘religious beliefs, since they are not known to be true, cannot be imparted by the p.

Burgess, J.P. and Rosen, G. Subject with No ObjectElliott, R.Faking Nature.

Burgess, J.P. and Rosen, G. Subject with No ObjectElliott, R.Faking Nature.

Burgess, J.P. and Rosen, G. Subject with No ObjectElliott, R.Faking Nature.

Burgess, J.P. and Rosen, G. Subject with No ObjectElliott, R.Faking Nature.

Perhaps more than any other contemporary scholar, Mark Siderits has illuminated the deep connections between ontology, explanation, epistemology, and philosophy of language in Indian Buddhist philosophy. His ground-breaking interpretations of Abhidharma and Madhyamaka—particularly concerning reductionism, emptiness, and the two truths—have largely set the terms of debate in Anglophone Buddhist philosophy. This chapter is very much in the spirit of Siderits’ work, though it will reach conclusions somewhat at odds with his own. The first part of the chapter will examine the (...) ontological and explanatory reductionism of much Abhidharma thought. The thorough-going reductionism of Abhidharma yields a two-tiered ontology of ultimately real and (merely) conventionally real entities, and a correspondingly two-tiered account of ultimate and conventional truth. The second part of the chapter will take up the Madhyamaka critique of Buddhist reductionism and the philosophical consequences of the view that all things are empty (śūnya) of inherent existence (svabhāva). If all things are empty, then arguably Abhidharma reductionism is undermined. That is, if everything is empty of inherent existence, then the project of reducing things to that which exists inherently is doomed. Moreover, as Sidertis has so forcefully argued, the Madhyamaka view of emptiness undermines the Abhidharma distinction between two truths. As he provocatively puts it, for the Mādhyamika, “the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth” (Siderits and Katsura 2013, p. 273). Hence, if all things are empty, all real entities are conventionally real, and all truths are conventionally true. Yet, as discussed in part three of the chapter, this raises the specter of the ‘dismal slough’—a pernicious ontological and epistemic flattening that threatens to undermine the critical and revisionist force Buddhist philosophy. How might a Mādhyamika avoid the dismal slough? One approach, explored in Siderits’ more recent work, is to, as it were, transpose Buddhist reductionism into a Mādhyamika key. Here the strategy is to show that while Buddhist reductionism cannot provide an account of ultimate reality, it still offers the best account of conventional reality. It will be argued that recent work in the philosophy of science gives reasons to doubt this approach. Finally, section four of the chapter will explore an alternative, post-reductionist strategy for avoiding the dismal slough. This alternative is based on three key ideas. (shrink)

Michael Hand presents the problem for his paper succinctly in his response: ‘religious beliefs, since they are not known to be true, cannot be imparted by the p.

Keith Thomas: Gerald Edward Aylmer, 1926-2000 Adrian Hollis: William Spencer Barrett, 1914-2001 Bruce Williams: Charles Frederick Carter, 1919-2002 Malcolm Mackintosh: John Erickson, 1929-2002 J. H .R. Davis: Raymond William Firth, 1901-2002 F. M. L. Thompson: Hrothgar John Habakkuk, 1915-2002 A. W. Price: Richard Mervyn Hare, 1919-2002 Hugh Lloyd-Jones: Geoffrey Stephen Kirk, 1921-2003 Michael Lapidge and Peter Matthews: Vivien Anne Law, 1954-2002 Ann Moss: John Lough, 1913-2000 Terence Cave: Ian Dalrymple McFarlane, 1915-2002 Ludwig Paul: David Neil MacKenzie, 1926-2001 Peter Birks: (...) John Kieran Barry Moylan Nicholas, 1919-2002 Jonathan Shepard: Dimitri Dimitrievich Obolensky, 1918-2001 David Cannadine: John Harold Plumb, 1911-2001 Daniel Waley: Nicolai Rubinstein, 1911-2002 Ian Wood: John Michael Wallace-Hadrill, 1916-1985 R. G. M. Nisbet: William Smith Watt, 1913-2002 G. W. Bernard: Richard Bruce Wernham, 1906-1999. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Deception in Psychological ResearchJohn P. Gluck and Stephen Hahn-SmithMadam: In the March 1995 issue of the KIEJ, Sissela Bok adds meaningfully to her consistent and important analysis of the harms associated with deception in biomedical and behavioral research. She reminds us that investigator and review committee domination of the analysis of costs and benefits deprives the prospective research subjects of the opportunity to apply their unique sense of values (...) and preferences, an obligation that flows from an authentic respect for persons and a recognition of the importance of autonomy.She also correctly points out that the American Psychological Association (APA) is unique in that it acknowledges the harms of deception by requiring scientific [End Page 386] justification, limiting the scope of what factors can be part of the deception, and supporting minimal duration of deception, at the same time as it maintains a very permissive stance toward its use. For example, the APA code of conduct requires that alternatives to deception be implemented only when they are deemed to be "equally effective."What Bok omits in her critique is that a common justification for the use of deception by psychologists is the belief that many research subjects actually benefit from being deceived. This impression is based on studies that interview subjects at some point in time after their experimental experience. For example, Smith and Richardson (1983, p. 1080) concluded that: "In general, respondents who have been deceived while participating in psychological research did not report negative effects of their experience. In fact, they perceived their experiences more positively that did respondents who had not participated in studies employing deception." Christensen (1988, p. 668), after reviewing the literature on subject reaction to deception, states that the evidence supports the notion that deception experiments are perceived as "more enjoyable and beneficial than nondeception experiments." He goes on to say that in the face of these data it may be that deception has gotten its bad name from philosophers!Basing the acceptability of deception on direct sampling of subjects' highly personal reactions assumes that the procedure yields responses that are valid on their face. If this is true, it would seem to undermine the typical justification for deception in the first place, which is that subjects when asked for personal information are likely to respond in misleading ways. It is important to note that evidence suggests that if subjects are queried about the acceptability of deception prior to actual participation, substantial proportions of subjects judge deception to be unacceptable (Korn 1987). These results are consistent with our own recently completed research, which shows that subjects asked about their reactions following participation in a deception experiment did indeed tend to indicate its acceptability. However, when asked to make a judgment about what reactions other students had to the same experiment, they expressed concern that others may have been harmed by the deception.For psychologists to selectively disregard the distinct possibility of dynamically motivated minimization of harm in order to justify deceptive research practices further supports Bok's characterization of today's competitive research environment and the standards of personal integrity that it challenges.Stephen Hahn-SmithDepartment of Psychology The University of New Mexico Albuquerque, NMReferencesChristensen, Larry. 1988. Deception in Psychological Research: When is it Justified? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 14: 664-75. Google ScholarKorn, James H. 1987. Judgements of Acceptability of Deception in Psychological Research. Journal of General Psychology 114: 205-6. [End Page 387]Google ScholarSmith, Steven S., and Richardson, Deborah. 1983 Amelioration of Deception and Harm in Psychological Research: The Important Role of Debriefing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 44: 1075-82. [End Page 388]Google ScholarCopyright © 1995 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

In this paper we describe a method for the specification of computationalmodels of argument using dialogue games. The method, which consists ofsupplying a set of semantic definitions for the performatives making upthe game, together with a state transition diagram, is described in full.Its use is illustrated by some examples of varying complexity, includingtwo complete specifications of particular dialogue games, Mackenzie's DC,and the authors' own TDG. The latter is also illustrated by a fully workedexample illustrating all the features of the (...) game. (shrink)

A thoughtful addition to the growing debate over public and private morality. Looks at lying and deception in law, family, medicine, government.

Shows how the ethical issues raised by secrets and secrecy in our careers or private lives take us to the heart of the critical questions of private and public morality.